How to determine black marketing?

In a market-driven economy, it is difficult to determine whether the price that is being charged is black-marketing.

Recently, the Chief Minister of Bihar, Jitan Ram Manjhi, stirred up a controversy when he said that hoarding and black marketing of goods by small traders will not be treated as a crime. He may have been politically incorrect yet he was logically correct.

The hoarding and black marketing by small traders have no material impact on the demand and supply of goods in the market as the quantity of goods being hoarded by these small traders are insignificant.

Black marketing might be socially reprehensible and ethically wrong but there is nothing to prevent a businessperson from increasing the price to meet the pressing needs of the escalating cost.

In a market-driven economy, where there is no price ceiling, it is difficult to determine whether the price that is being charged is black-marketing. In the case of commodities, where there is no concept of an MRP, the concept of black marketing is even more questionable.

Blaming the small traders of hoarding and black-marketing creates more panic than to actually resolving supply side concerns. In modern commercial economy, hoarding and black marketing is a flawed logic that is often blamed for price increase. Small traders with limited financial resources can hardly make any dent on the price of a commodity or its availability.

Politicians browbeat the mythical hoarders for price rise often forgetting that the activity of hoarding needs very large and continuous supply of finance which no small trader possesses in India.

The agricultural physical market in Bihar and other States do not operate on a leveraged model and is also not a heavily financed model, unlike the trade of crude and metals in the international scenario.

In the past, it has been conclusively proven that when non-binding price ceilings are put in place to prevent price gouging in the event of natural disasters, it may actually reduce incentives for sellers to be well-stocked with goods as they will be unable to command the full market price for the commodities.

Normally, the supply and demand dictate price. However, when prices are fixed, demand outstrips supply. Thus, shortages become inevitable. As experience with rent control shows, capping prices in times of scarcity has perverse effect of reducing quantity of commodity or the service supplied.

Consumers understandably get upset when they face dramatic price increases within a short time. However, capping prices would actually lead to less being sold, as suppliers reduce the quantity that they are willing to sell in order to avoid losses. Shortages are, therefore, exacerbated.

By contrast, anyone who tries to unreasonably price the commodity will find himself with unsold supply and will be forced to lower his prices to offload it. In reality, it can be very difficult to determine the extent to which price increases are greater than “necessary” and even more difficult to determine what is black-marketing.

Published in The Business Line on 25 Sept, 2014

How to make delivery in commodity futures foolproof

A third party audit should be done periodically to ensure stock quality and quantity

The Forward Markets Commission (FMC) must be complimented for circulating the draft norms on “Strengthening of warehousing facilities in commodity futures market” in the public domain. This initiative can achieve a lot more than just transparency. If executed well, it would drive trading traffic back to commodity exchanges, which are currently bearing the brunt of the lack of confidence on the part of market participants.

Fixing responsibility

In spite of earlier directives from the FMC, exchanges had said that the onus of quality and quantity of commodities lay entirely with the concerned warehouse service provider (WSP). The current draft norms (dated August 26, 2014) and an earlier circular (dated August 30, 2013) put to rest all confusion on this issue by explicitly clarifying that commodity exchanges are primarily responsible for delivery settlement of future contracts and that WSPs act only as agents of the exchange.

The norms of net worth for WSPs have also been prescribed. However, more than net worth, it is essential that the exchange delivery activity of a WSP (which is an independent business unit) be ring-fenced from other activities.

Over the years with fading cash-carry margins, exchange deposits and exchange warehousing margins have shrunk. Therefore, WSPs need other sources of revenue. So, it will be naïve of us to say that the WSP should not engage in any activity other than exchange delivery. Yet it is essential that the liability of other activities of the WSP’s not have spill over into exchange delivery, which may seriously jeopardise the price discovery mechanism.

Covering risks

Currently, exchanges are taking cash deposits and bank guarantees (as security) from WSPs to insulate the “incident effect” of any bad delivery liability. However, on a freeze frame basis, Collateral Under Management (CUM) to bank guarantee (BG) ratio is often insufficient. There should be a standardisation of norms in this regard so that at no point should exchange deliverable goods in warehouses remain uncovered and discretionary. This can also bring in adequate variable coverage ratio into play as hundred percent coverage will be commercially unviable.

The insurance policy for all the exchange WSPs should be standardised, which in turn can be endorsed in favour of the exchanges. In case of any event of fire and other perils, the bridge pay-out to the members can be made from the Investor Protection Fund till the time the final settlement is made by the insurance companies. Currently, exchanges disclose their stock and space availability, which may turn out to be a serious systemic lacuna. In the case of NSEL, we had already seen a fatal gap in this with the exchange’s stock positions.

Independent inspections

Therefore, a regulator-owned software should be made mandatory whereby all exchanges and WSPs should enter their stock and space availability at each location. There should be third party independent audits to periodically check stock both in terms of quality and quantity. The existing cross audits by WSPs at each other’s service location is not full proof and it can lead to messier situations.

In most jurisdictions, decisions regarding implementation of these measures are left to the discretion of the exchange, without the need for any prior approval, implicit or express, from the regulatory authority. This is dangerous and the loophole can be exploited. On the other hand, allowing member/clients to do their own inspections will lead to the collapse of the delivery system and unnecessary disputes and litigation. Therefore, these stock audits should be conducted by reputed and independent inspection agencies appointed by the regulator.

Last but not the least, virtually all of the harmful opacity can be ended with a common clearing house (incorporated outside the individual exchange’s domain) and by making physical stock management more transparent. This will ensure system, process and audit integrity in the exchange delivery and settlement space.

Published in The Business Line on 11 September 2014